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Abstract: This paper assesses the eﬀects of income redistribu-
tion policies on “responsibility-sensitive” fairness levels in ma-
jor Latin American countries. In doing so, the following items
are analyzed: i) the fairness rule described in Bossert (1995),
Konow (1996), and Cappelen & Tungodden (2007) and; ii) the
redistribution mechanism (taxation policy) proposed by Ooghe
& Peich (2010). The results indicate that taxation does not
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on Latin American fairness indicators.
This behavior can be explained, among other factors, by the
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11 Introduction
Although the recent literature indicates a close relationship between wealth
distribution and economic eﬃciency,1 this argument is hardly taken into con-
sideration by public policymakers. Usually, in democratic societies, redistri-
bution and social security policies are formulated to meet the ethical outcry
for justice, often represented by a more equal income distribution.
This school of thought can be found in government’s conventional optimal
size models. Inﬂuenced by the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971), redistribution
and social spending have been considered to be closely related to income
inequality. For Meltzer & Richard (1981), for instance, the central planner
maximizes the median voter’s utility by observing the assymmetry of income
distribution. Therefore, the lower the median voter’s income compared to the
mean voter’s, the stronger the redistribution policy (selﬁsh redistribution) to
be adopted.
Following this reasoning, the eﬀectiveness of a redistribution policy2 could
be veriﬁed by the comparison of inequality levels before and after tax and
transfers (henceforth pretax and post-tax). This is summarized in Figure 1,
where pretax (in blue) and post-tax (in gray) Gini coeﬃcients of inequal-
ity are plotted for a set of selected countries.3 As depicted, the tax and
government transfer systems signiﬁcantly reduce the concentration levels in
developed countries (40%, on average. From 47.6 to 28.2). In Latin American
countries, however, the eﬀect is virtually zero.
FIGURE 1 HERE
A possible conclusion of this analysis is that, at least in developed coun-
tries, these public policies enhance social justice. It is assumed that the
social norm of justice, used as a parameter for the design of the redistribu-
tion policy, is the strict equality. Nevertheless, recent developments show
that individual and social perceptions about inequality are much more rel-
evant for the central planner’s decision-making process than is the income
concentration level.
For further understanding, imagine that individual results are determined
by “responsibility” and “non-responsibility” factors (Roemer, 1998). In other
words, some of the individual income is regarded as a result of eﬀort (e.g.,
investment in human capital, migration decisions and hours worked every
1See Galor & Zeira (1993) and Banerjee & Newman (1993), among others.
2Hereafter, the term “redistribution policy” will summarize government actions associ-
ated with social spending, income transfers and taxation.
3This information is available from Latin American Economic Outlook 2009, pg. 122:
http://www.oecd.org.
2week, i.e., responsibility variables), while the remainder is conditional on
circumstances, such as family background, race, sex, place of birth, among
others.
So, let us assume that only those inequalities related to circumstantial
or non-responsibility variables are socially undesirable. According to these
arguments, the egalitarian rule is relegated to the background, prompting the
emergence of “responsibility-sensitive” concepts.4 The responsibility-sensitive
principle posits that economic and social policies should only interfere with
inequality caused by circumstances, rendering individuals accountable for the
consequences of their personal decisions.
In fact, as pointed out in Alesina & Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou & Ti-
role (2006), the magnitude of the government’s social action does not depend
only on the level of inequality, as suggested by the models of Mirrlees (1971)
and Meltzer & Richard (1981), but on the composition of this inequality.
In brief, as suggested by Roemer (1998), inequality can presumably be de-
composed into eﬀort and circumstantial (luck) factors, in a such a way that
redistribution policies will be larger, the larger the social belief that income
derives from luck.
In this respect, the comparison of pretax and post-tax Gini coeﬃcients
(Figure 1) does not necessarily mean that redistribution policies are fairer
or less fair. That is, in the case of developed countries, the reduction in
inequality observed after government intervention could possibly maintain
or even increase the level of injustice.
An indicative sign of the actual impact of the redistribution policy of
developed countries on the level of justice is available in Ooghe & Peich
(2010). In sum, those authors demonstrate that in countries where eﬀort
is seen as key to the deﬁnition of individual income, the perception about
inequality (and, therefore, the redistributive design used) diﬀers from that of
countries where luck is believed to play a central role. Thus, it is possible to
identify sets of countries with clear-cut deﬁnitions of fair taxation.
The case of Latin American countries is more noteworthy as redistribution
does not even aﬀect income concentration. Hence, it can be unfair both in the
strict equality and responsibility-sensitive perspectives. Some studies have
already investigated, either directly or indirectly, the levels of fair and unfair
income concentrations in these countries.5 However, little attention has been
paid to the role of the design of redistribution policies in the promotion of
a fairer society. The available studies investigate the role of ﬁscal policy on
4In fact, not even modern egalitarians such as Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981) and Ar-
neson (1989) use strict equality as a benchmark.
5See Barros et al. (2009).
3conventional concentration levels (cf. Goñi et al., 2008).
Therefore, the aim of the present study is to assess the impact of redis-
tribution policies on the responsibility-sensitive fairness level of major Latin
American countries. The investigation includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay. The analysis will be carried out as follows:
1) pretax and post-tax fairness indicators will be calculated for each country;
2) the design of ﬁscal policy will then be evaluated based on a mechanism that
takes into consideration individual diﬀerences in eﬀort and circumstances.
For the ﬁrst item, the fairness rule described in Bossert (1995), Konow
(1996), and Cappelen & Tungodden (2007) will be used. The assessment
of the redistribution mechanism, item 2, will follow the theoretical model of
Ooghe & Peich (2010). This approach is consistent with modern egalitarian-
ism, which admits that the income of agents results both from factors beyond
their control and from partially controllable factors.6
Finally, the paper is organized into two parts. Each one contains a theo-
retical and an empirical section. Section 2 presents the results for pretax and
post-tax fairness measures. Section 3 asseses the ﬁscal policy of the selected
countries. Section 4 concludes.
2 Mensuring Fairness Levels
The (un)fairness levels will be assessed in two steps. The ﬁrst one, subsection
2.1, establishes an individual fairness rule, zi, based on responsibility criteria.
Subsequently, the rules calculated for each country are compared with the
current income distribution (subsection 2.2).
The empirical analysis discusses two concepts of income: pretax and post-
tax. Subsection 2.2 seeks to answer the following two basic questions: 1)
how far from fair distribution are the investigated countries?; 2)
does the redistribution system of these countries allow reducing
the distance between the observed income and the fairness rule?
2.1 Individual Fairness Levels
Consider a society A, containing N = {1,...,n} individuals. Each individual
i ∈ A is characterized by a pair (yA
i ,zA
i ), where yA
i is the observed income
6The consideration of partially controllable variables is a generalization of the concept
proposed by Roemer (1998). Further details can be found in Section 3.
4and zA
i is the fair income. Bearing in mind an egalitarian society, the fairness
parameter will be zA
i =  (A), with  (A) = n−1 P
i yA
i . In other words,




i , will be regarded as unfair.
As highlighted earlier, the main problem with this criterion is that it
does not contemplate merit diﬀerences among individuals, given that the
mean income is taken as a single rule. This way, some unjust judgments
could ensue, i.e., two people can have diﬀerent income levels because one of
them strives more.
Owing to this limitation, one proposes replacing the conventional mea-
sures of inequality with indicators based on responsibility-sensitive criteria.
To do so, it is necessary to replace the fairness rule based on perfect equality.
The ﬁrst step is to assume that the economic outcome of each agent i results
from responsibility factors, xR





Following Bossert (1995), Konow (1996), and Cappelen & Tungodden
(2007), it is assumed that each agent i has a merit (or aﬃrmation) level.
This pattern is determined by the mean distribution of a hypothetical income,
where all other individuals have a responsibility level equal to i.
The function that deﬁnes the aﬃrmation of individual i, g(xR
























Note that (2.1) sets the non-responsibility factors, measuring the ratio
between the eﬀort of individual i to the eﬀort of other individuals. So, zi
denotes the fraction of overall income individual i should get, given his/her
proportional level of eﬀort.
From an empirical perspective, f(xR
i ,xNR






i + ǫi. [2.2]
However, some remarks about (2.2) are deemed necessary. First of all, it is
not always possible to have non-responsibility variables, especially, informa-
tion on family background. Therefore, the error term (ǫi) which would theo-
5retically stand for brute luck includes both responsibility and non-responsibility
factors.
Because of that, Devooght (2008) uses a normative criterion where ǫi is in-
cluded in the set of compensation variables (xNR
i ). To do that, he substitutes










Parameter (2.3) is built upon the following view on fairness: population
groups are deﬁned according to their responsibility variables, and any within-
group inequality is deemed unfair. In other words, if one considers hours
worked as the only responsibility variable, xR
i , all individuals who work for
the same number of hours must have the same income level. Outside this
pattern, any income inequality will be unfair (c.f. Devooght, 2008, Almås,
2008, and Almås et al., 2010).
Another relevant problem concerns how to determine the factors within
and without the realm of individual responsibility. According to Roemer
(1998), the categorization into compensation and responsibility variables is
not clear in a few cases. As a rule of thumb, only extrema are accepted:
either the characteristic is fully under the control of agents or there exists no
control whatsoever. To get around this problem, as in Almås et al. (2010),
robustness checks will be used to assess the results of distance measures in
diﬀerent sets of responsibility variables (xR
i ).7
2.2 Results
As underscored previously, the aim of this subsection is to measure the dis-
tance between the observed income and the fair rule. Two concepts of income,
pretax and post-tax, are used. Each concept of income has one fairness rule.
The starting point for the design of rule (2.3) is the estimation of earnings
equation (2.2). Due to the lack of variables xNR
i , this procedure will be per-
formed in two steps. In the ﬁrst one, (2.2) is inferred only with variables
xR
i , with the later use of parameter and residual values for construction of
indicator (2.3).
The set of responsibility variables will be: a) the individual’s schooling
years; b) hours worked every week and; c) a proxy for experience built upon
information on the age of individuals. The dependent variable will be the
logarithm of real personal income from all jobs, pretax and post-tax. The
7Section 3 results do not have this problem since they are based on the concept of
partial responsibility (cf. Ooghe, 2010).
6data sources, as well as the detailed information about the variables, are
summarized in Appendix A1.
Some descriptive statistics for this dataset are displayed in Table 1. Roughly
speaking, note that most of the country samples comprise employed, married
and male individuals who work more than 30 hours per week. Most of them
are young (Age1+Age2 > 50%), and have poor qualiﬁcation (E1+E2 > 50%).
TABLE 1 HERE
The results for the ﬁrst step of the estimation of (2.2), only for pretax
income, are shown in Table 2.8 In general, the parameters related to hours
worked and education are signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the importance of unob-
servable variables is greater for Brazil, since R2-adjusted amounts to nearly
9%. This behavior can be interpreted in many ways. One can say that, as
the construction of the fairness rule assumes that unobservable factors (error
term) are the non-responsibility variables, a small R2-adjusted implies that
these factors have a heavier weight on Brazilian earnings, compared to those
of other countries, especially Argentina (R2-adjusted=27%). In other words,
pretax income in Brazil depends much more on variables related to origin,
color and family background than on factors associated with eﬀort. An al-
ternative explanation is that the quality of education, the major explanatory
variable, is lower in Brazil than in the other countries.
TABLE 2 HERE
The comparison of fairness rules with observed pretax and post-tax in-
comes is the key goal of this subsection. After all, how far apart are these
distributions? Does the redistribution system of these countries allow reduc-
ing the distance between the observed income and fair income?
Figures 1 through 4 give the ﬁrst answers to these questions. They show
the Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) for the logarithm of observed
income (pretax and post-tax) and their respective fairness rules. For space
restriction, only the results for Argentina and Brazil are displayed. The
visual analysis indicates that there is no signiﬁcant change in the distance
between the observed income distributions (pretax and post-tax) and the
fairness rules.
FIGURES 2, 3, 4, AND 5 HERE
The distances between these distributions will be formally quantiﬁed us-
ing the metric entropy measure developed by Granger et al. (2004). This
8The remaining results were omitted due to space restrictions.
7indicator is normalized between 0 and 1. Where 0 indicates that the distribu-
tions are identical. Maasoumi et al. (2007) assert that this tool is adequate
for assessing the distance across distributions and the “goodness of ﬁt” in
nonlinear regression models. With respect to its use in studies on income
distribution, there is at least one advantage over the distance measures pro-
posed by Cowell (1980): the possibility to establish the statistical signiﬁcance
of the distances using nonparametric simulation methods.
Therefore, the analysis will be carried out as follows: 1) the distances













where f(y) and g(y) are the marginal densities of the observed income and
of the fair income, respectively; 2) the statistical signiﬁcance of the distances
is determined using a hypothesis test, where H0 : Sρ = 0 and; 3) after
calculating the distances between the two concepts of income and the fairness
rules, the procedure is repeated to compare pretax and post-tax fairness rules.
Thus, it is possible to check whether the redistribution system signiﬁcantly
changes the fairness patterns.
The inference of distance indicators is summarized in Table 3.9 In the
comparison across countries, Colombia and Brazil are those with the largest
distance between observed and fair incomes. As to the results for pretax and
post-tax incomes, which provide an insight into the impact of redistribution
policies, the sharpest reduction in the indicator Sρ was observed in Chile,
around 3%, followed by Argentina and Uruguay. All distances are signiﬁcant
at 1%, which indicates that the diﬀerences shown in Figures 2 through 4 are
rather impressive.
TABLE 3 HERE
Nonetheless, the comparison of distances between pretax and post-tax
fairness rules points out that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in any of the
countries. This result indicates that redistribution policies do not reduce
unfairness in the set of investigated countries.
To check the robustness of results, two structures are used for the set of
responsibility variables. This procedure, suggested by Almås et al. (2010),
9Entropy measures are calculated as follows: i) the condtional Rosenblatt-Parzen den-
sity is computed via cross-validation; ii) a grid restricted to the interval [-0.25,0.25] is built
with 501 points; iii) the Rosenblatt-Parzen kernel estimator is assessed in this grid; iv) the
entropies are calculated based on the previous steps. The hypothesis tests are run using
bootstrap simulation with 999 replicates.
8measures the sensitivity of results to diﬀerent sets of responsibility variables.
Hence, besides the results including all variables (Table 3), two sets of vari-
ables (xR
i ) are used: a) Unfair1, with only the hours worked variable; b)
Unfair2, with hours worked and age. The results are displayed in Table 4.
TABLE 4 HERE
The results show that the responsibility cut does not aﬀect the results ob-
tained in Table 3 in a signiﬁcant fashion. Note that: a) Colombia and Brazil
still have the largest distances; b) the redistribution mechanism reduces the
distances and; c) pretax and post-tax fairness rules are still statistically iden-
tical.
In sum, the results indicate that redistribution policies do not have a sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on responsibility-sensitive inequality indicators. These results,
coupled to the evidence shown in Figure 1, indicate that the Latin American
redistributin mechanism is unfair both in the perspective of strict equality
and of modern fairness rules. Therefore, the study seeks to investigate the
ﬁscal mechanism of these countries The analysis is conducted in the next
section.
3 Fair and Eﬃcient Taxation
The previous section results demonstrated that the redistribution mech-
anism of Latin American countries does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
responsibility-sensitive unfairness levels. This section assesses the ﬁscal sys-
tems of these countries in light of fairness.
Subsection 2.1 summarizes the model of Ooghe & Peich (2010). The
focus will be on key equations and comments. Derivations, Lemmas and
Propositions will be omitted because of space restrictions.
3.1 Model
Summary: The model leads to two basic propositions: (I) the tax rate asso-
ciated with non-controllable characteristics must be higher compared to those
in which control is partial; (II) the overall eﬀect of the non-controllable char-
acteristics on post-tax income must be zero. That is, the redistribution mech-
anism should be such that, once redistribution takes place, non-controllable
characteristics have no relationship at all with net income. This one should
thus vary due only to diﬀerent eﬀort levels or to the other characteristics
controlled by the agents.
9Base: Let y be the gross income. That is, income before tax. Consider J to
be a ﬁnite set of characteristics. If y is a function of a vector of characteristics
x, with x ∈ ℜJ, then




Where each speciﬁc characteristic, xj, is determined by the combination of
eﬀort, e ∈ ℜJ, and circumstance, θ ∈ ℜJ. This combination involves a
degree of control φj, which takes on value zero if the characteristic denotes
pure eﬀort and value one if it denotes pure circumstance. So, for each j ∈ J:
xj = φjej + (1 − φj)θ. [3.2]
Where φ ∈ (0,1)J is a vector of weights that is the same for all individuals.
Assume that each characteristic xj is taxed such that the post-tax income c
is less than or equal to the gross income y




In this case, t0 ∈ ℜ controls the overall level of net income and tj ∈ ℜJ
is the tax rate associated with characteristic xj. Also consider a quasi-linear
preference structure:










That is, individual utility is a function of net income c, of eﬀort e, and of two
new parameters: γ ∈ ℜJ associated with the disutility of eﬀort and; δ ∈ ℜJ
is a vector of control for the degree of convexity of the eﬀort cost, supposedly
the same for all individuals. The resulting optimal eﬀort choices and indirect
utility can be observed in Lemma 1 of Ooghe & Peich (2010, p. 5).
Central Planner: Consider F to be the multivariate distribution of circum-
stances and G to be the multivariate distribution of preferences. The social
planner chooses rates t0 and tj which maximize social welfare subjected to








dF(θ)dG(γ) ≥ R0. [3.5]
Where
10θ ∼ N( 
θ,Σ
θ), γ ∼ N( 
γ,Σ
γ). [3.6]
In addition, R0 is an exogenous revenue per capita demand, x∗
j is the ex-




ij are matrices, i × j. With regard to aggregate welfare, the planner
considers eﬃciency under Pareto and fairness under selective egalitarism.
This is represented by a Kolm-Pollak function, where aggregate wefare is
deﬁned as a sum of individual exponential, concave and increasing functions.
In this structure, direct welfare does not depend on circumstance θ, so the
welfare diﬀerentials between individuals with the same preference and with
the same eﬀort result from diiﬀerentials in post-tax income c. In addition,
Pigou-Dalton transfers increase aggregate welfare. These considerations are
summarized in Lemmas 2 and 3 (Ooghe & Peich, 2010, pp. 7–8).
Finally, if all individuals are subjected to the same circumstances, then all
of them obtain the same laissez-faire welfare level deﬁned by (t0,t) = (R0,0).
In this case, deviations of t = 0 reduce welfare.
Result: The social planner’s problem lies in choosing ﬁscal design (t0,t) to







Subject to budgetary restriction (3.5), with r > 0 inequality aversion pa-
rameter, R0 exogenous (per-capita) revenue requirement, indirect individual
welfare v( ), and distributions F and G are presented in (3.6).
Based on Proposition 1 (Ooghe & Peich, 2010, p. 8), one obtains the
laissez-faire result if the planner does not worry about compensation (r → 0)
or if the circumstances are homogeneous (Σ → 0). In this case, in the
optimum, (t0,t) = (R0,0). Two speciﬁc cases are also discussed: (i) Mirleees:
the result is deﬁned by an exogenous characteristic (income); (ii) Akerlof:
endogenous and exogenous (non-controllable) characteristics are considered.
The second case is especially interesting as it provides testable hypotheses
that do not depend on the degree of control or on inequality aversion.
(i) The Mirlees case: It is the simplest one. Suppose that product y is a
function of only one characteristic: wages x1, with y = x1 = φ1e1+(1−φ1)θ1.











11Thus, tax rate t∗
1 levied on earnings x1:
(a) Is between extrema, 0 < t∗
1 < 1;
(b) Decreases with elasticity δ1, ranging from full taxation, in the case of
perfect inelasticity of eﬀort (t∗
1 → 1 if δ1 → 0) to taxation in the case of
perfect elasticity of eﬀort (t∗
1 → 0 if δ1 → ∞);
(c) Increases with inequality aversion r, ranging from non-taxation if the
planner is inequality-neutral (t∗
1 → 1 if r → 0) to partial taxation if the
planner is worried only about inequality (t∗






11 + (1 − φ1)σθ
11
.
(d) Increases with the heterogeneity of circumstances σθ
11, ranging from non-
taxation if all experience the same circumstances (t∗
1 → 0 if σθ
11 → 0) to full
taxation if circumstances are rather heterogeneous (t∗
1 → 1 if σθ
11 → ∞);
(e) Decreases with the heterogeneity of preferences σ
γ
11, ranging from partial
taxation if all have the same preferences (0 < t∗
1 < 1 se σ
γ
11 → 0) to zero
taxation if preferences are rather heterogeneous (t∗
1 → 0 if σ
γ
11 → ∞);
(f) Decreases with the degree of control φ, ranging from full taxation if gains
cannot be controlled (t∗
1 → 1 if φ1 → 0) to non-taxation if gains are totally
controllable (t∗
1 → 0 if φ1 → 1).
The last item addresses the contribution of Ooghe & Peichl (2010) to the
literature.
(ii) The Akerlof case: Suppose that there are two characteristics, earnings
x1 = φ1e1 + (1 − φ1)θ1 and an exogenous characteristic x2 = θ. Admit the












(1 − t1)(1 − φ1)σ
θ
21 + (β2 − t2)σ
θ
22 = 0
Where ξ = (1 − φ1) + β2. Note that t∗
1 satisﬁes items (a)–(f) described





1 is reduced to zero and all taxation will
12occur via t∗
2 , provided that the latter is a perfect signal of earnings ability
and can be taxed at zero cost.
The second ﬁrst-order condition is the most interesting for the aims of
this study, which can be rewritten as






× (1 − t1)(1 − φ1) = 0 [3.8]
In general, equation (3.8) shows that the total marginal eﬀect of θ2 on
net output c should equal zero in a fair tax system. Based on Lemma 1, (3.8)
can be rewritten as:
x
∗





12 = (1 − φ1)σθ
12 and σx∗
22 = σθ
22. Using these formulas,
one gets the empirical counterpart for theoretical formula (3.8):






× (1 − t1) = 0.
Note that neither the degree of control nor inequality aversion r need to
be observed to test them.
3.2 Empirical Model
Let w denote the vector of covariables, which can be decomposed into w =
(wj)j∈J, where wj is the covariable for characteristic j in J. If “ ” represents
the vectorial product, then the pretax income regression will be
y = b0 + b   w + ǫ
y = b0 +
X
j∈J
bjwj + ǫ [3.9]
y ≈ βw
Deﬁning β0 ≈ b0, β ≈ 1 and x ≈ ((bjwj)j∈J,ǫ) the vector of character-
istics, including the unobservable ones, the rate (or subsidy, if negative) is
equal to
τ = y − c = t0 + tx [3.10]
Note the necessity for a two-step strategy to estimate t0 and t. First
one estimates (3.9), obtaining prediction ˆ x ≈ ((ˆ bjwj)j∈J,ˆ ǫ). Afterwards, one
13estimates (3.10), replacing x with ˆ x and correcting standard errors. The
estimations can follow a simple OLS strategy.
In this case, one obtains the estimates for the implicit rates so as to test
prediction (I), presented at the beginning of the section. To test prediction
(II), consider the categorization of the set of observable characteristics into
non-controllable (N) and partially controllable (P) characteristics. Admit
the unobservable error term as a separate and independent characteristic.











In this case, (3.8) is reduced to






× (1 − tP) = 0.
Two hypotheses are then obtained:
(i) Weak hypothesis: If σx∗
PN/σx∗
NN ≈ −1 , then tN ≈ tP;
That is, if σx∗
PN/σx∗
NN is greater than -1, the rate associated with non-
controllable characteristics is higher than that which is associated with par-
tially controllable characteristics. Note that σx∗
PN/σx∗
NN corresponds to a1 in
regression:
xP = a0 + a1xN + η. [3.11]
One can also deﬁne






× (1 − tP), [3.12]
as a fairness measure. i.e.: the total marginal eﬀect of non-controllable char-
acteristics on the net outcome. In a fair ﬁscal design, this measure is equal
to zero.
(ii) Strong hypothesis: FM = 0.
To estimate the fairness measure, consider
c = (β0 − t0) + (1 − tP)xP + (1 − tN)xN + (1 − tU)xU. [3.13]
Substituting (3.11) into (3.13) and assuming a1 = σx∗
PN/σx∗
NN:







Where (β0−t0)+(1−tP)a0 is the constant and the term between square
brackets, (1 − tP)σx∗
PN/σx∗
NN + (1 − tN), associated with xN, is the fairness
measure. Again, note the necessity for a two-step procedure. First, one
estimates (3.9) to get ˆ x = (ˆ xN, ˆ xP, ˆ xU). Afterwards, one estimates (3.14)
using (ˆ xN, ˆ xU), which provides the estimate for the fairness measure.
3.3 Results
This subsection will test two basic predictions of the model developed by
Ooghe & Peich (2010), namely: (I) the tax rate associated with character-
istics ’non control’ should be greater than those which are ’partial control’;
(II) the total eﬀect of non-controllable characteristics on the post-tax income
should be zero. To achieve that, the tests described in (3.12) and (3.14) will
be used. That is, the strong and weak hypotheses about the eﬀect of non-
controllable characteristics on partially controllable characteristics and on
income.
The logic of these predictions is straightforward: aside from income level,
the tax rate must include individual characteristics. Individuals with “privi-
leged” non-controllable characteristics have to pay a higher rate. In addition,
the rates associated with this set of characteristics should be higher than
those associated with partially controllable characteristics. This imposition
indicates that variables related to eﬀort and merit should not be overtaxed.
For example, if a country is characterized by gender, men (“privileged”
non-controllable characteristic, by supposition) should pay a higher rate
than should women. The guarantee that all diﬀerences associated with non-
controllable characteristics will be equalized is given by prediction II.
The ﬁrst step to the empirical analysis is the estimation of implicit rates
related to each characteristic. Equations (3.9) and (3.10) were inferred from
a two-stage OLS strategy. The dependent variable is the equivalent family
income.10 The following are regarded as partially controllable characteristics:
hours worked, education, being married and employment. The set of non-
controllable variables includes age and sex.
10Note that the logarithm of income is not used. Detailed information about the con-
struction of variables can be obtained in Appendix A.2.
15The estimation results are shown in Tables 5 and 6, ﬁrst and second
stages, respectively. The ﬁrst-stage estimates are used to obtain the pre-
dicted values for controllable characteristics and for the residual, i.e., ˆ x ≈
((ˆ bjwj)j∈J,ˆ ǫ). For instance, the “Educ” variable in Table 6 is constructed
from parameters related to E1, E2 and E3 obtained in Table 5. That is, for
Argentina: Educ= −551.58 × E1 − 392.56 × E2 − 316.87 × E3.
TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE
That being said, the results in Table 6 represent the implicit rates associ-
ated with each characteristic. A visual inspection indicates that Prediction
I is not observed in any of the investigated countries. That is, the rates
related to non-controllable characteristics are not always higher than the
others. This behavior is represented in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6 HERE
First, note that Brazil, Colombia and Mexico are the countries with the
highest overall rates.11 These countries also have the highest rates associated
with partially controllable characteristics. In general, one perceives that
the implicit rates associated with non-controllable characteristics are always
higher than the others.
To conﬁrm the results suggested in Figure 6, a hypothesis test based on
the estimation of (3.11) and (3.12) is used. The null hypothesis consists
of σx∗
PN/σx∗
NN < −1. That is, non-controllable characteristics have higher
implicit rates than partially controllable ones. The results in Table 7 indicate
that this hypothesis cannot be rejected in any of the selected Latin American
countries.
TABLE 7 HERE
In view of this evidence, the ﬁrst prediction of the theoretical model is
rejected. Furthermore, the behavior of the implicit rates allows stating that:
i) the Latin American tax system “punishes” merit, since partially control-
lable characteristics, such as, education and hours worked, have higher tax
rates. This conclusion holds for all the countries, but it is most remark-
able for Brazil, Colombia and Mexico; ii) as the rates associated with non-
controllable characteristics do not follow prediction I, one may suggest that
the tax system cannot reduce unequal opportunities in these countries.
11Appendix A3 decomposes rate τ into three components: income tax, social security
payments and beneﬁts. The analysis is conducted for the set of non-controllable and
partially controllable variables.
16To conﬁrm the non-equalization of circumstances in these countries, the
study uses a test for the second prediction. That is, for checking the eﬀect
of non-controllable characteristics on the post-tax income. The estimation
method is once again based on two stages, using the results predicted in (3.9)
(ˆ x ≈ ((ˆ bjwj)j∈J,ˆ ǫ)), and on the later estimation of (3.14).
TABLE 8 HERE
Table 8 shows the fairness indicator based on the taxation system. Bear-
ing in mind that fair taxation corresponds to FM = 0 (H0 of this new test).
FM′s distant from zero indicate that the country is not worried about com-
pensating for non-controllable characteristics. That is, the higher the FM,
the larger the unfairness. Once again, the results show that the tax system
of Latin American countries does not ﬁt into the fairness rules established by
Ooghe & Peich (2010). Just as in subsection 2.2, Brazil and Colombia have
the highest levels of unfairness.
Just to have some idea about the magnitude of these indicators, from
the evidence provided in Ooghe & Peich (2010), using a similar estima-
tion method, France and Luxembourg followed the theoretical predictions
of model (FM = 0). The highest rate was that of the USA, FM ≈ 0.42.
The other countries had FM′s between 0.15 and 0.25.
Therefore, Latin American countries are noteworthy not only because of
their high income inequalities, but also because of the remarkable unfairness
of their tax systems. Of the investigated countries, only Uruguay and Chile
had similar levels to those of the USA.
4 Final Remarks
The main objective of this study was to measure the impact of redistribu-
tion policies on the level of distributive fairness of a set of Latin American
countries. As redistribution has no impact on income concentration levels, a
responsibility-sensitive unfairness measure was used.
The ﬁrst results indicated a signiﬁcant distance between the observed
income (pretax and post-tax) and the respective fairness rule. That is, the
level of unfairness of the countries is statistically signiﬁcant. In this context,
Brazil and Colombia were the most unfair countries. The taxation policy
reduced the distance for the fairness pattern, however, the statistical tests
showed that the movement is not statistically relevant. In short, as with
income concentration levels, the redistribution policy does not cause any
impact on the distributive fairness of the investigated countries.
17Based on these ﬁndings, the study suggested assessing the ﬁscal system
of these countries. At that stage, the study investigated the whys and where-
fores of redistributive ineﬃciency. Using a fair and eﬃcient taxation model,
the conclusion is that the taxation system violates two basic principles of
fairness. Partially controllable characteristics, associated with eﬀort, are
overtaxed. In addition, the eﬀect of non-controllable variables on net income
is not zero. In brief, the tax system punishes merit and does not equalize the
diﬀerences in circumstances.
The magnitude of unfairness of the Latin American tax system becomes
more evident when it is compared to the results obtained by Ooghe & Peich
(2010). The Brazilian unfairness indicator, for instance, is almost three times
higher than that of the USA. The fairest countries, Uruguay and Chile, have
similar levels of unfairness to those observed in developed countries.
Finally, the explanations for the ineﬀectiveness of redistribution policies in
Latin American countries should be recalled. According to Goñi et al. (2008),
three factors need to be mentioned: (i) too low a volume of resources gets
collected and transferred; (ii) tax collection is regressive; and (iii) transfers
are poorly-targeted. The evidence provided herein allows including another
factor: the design of the ﬁscal policy does not contemplate the diﬀerent levels
of eﬀort and does not equalize the diﬀerent levels of circumstances.
APPENDIX
A1 – Section 2 Data: The inferences made in Section 2 are based on the
following variables: a) the real income of all jobs;12 b) years of s chooling split
into four categories: E1, low education, for individuals with up to 4 years of
schooling (including the illiterate), E2, four to eight years of schooling, E3,
nine to eleven years of schooling and, E4 for individuals with more than nine
years of schooling; c) hours worked and; d) age, summarized by six dummy
variables, the ﬁrst one which assumes value one if the individual is aged 26
to 35 years, Age1, the second one for those aged 36 to 45 years, Age2, and so
on and so forth.
Household heads are those men or women older than 26 years. The avail-
able income, post-tax, is obtained from the following rule: gross income –
income tax rate – social security payments + government transfers. Further




12The income will be deﬂated by the consumer price index of each country and converted






A2 – Section 3 Data: The model used in Section 3 considers the equiv-
alent family income. i.e.: yE
i = yi/
√
n. Where yi is the gross income, also
expressed in terms of purchasing power parity, and n is the household size.
In addition, information described in subsection A1 plus three dummy vari-
ables representing sex (male as reference), being married and employment
were used.
The microdata were obtained from:
Argentina: Encuesta de Impacto Social de la Crisis en Argentina (2002);
Brazil: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (2006);
Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (2006);
Colombia: Encuesta de Calidad de Vida (2003);
Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (2006);
Uruguay: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Ampliada (2006).
A3 – Decomposition of the Total Rate: The results established in Sec-
tion 3 considered that the available income is a function of a single τ rate. As
a matter of fact, this rate can be decomposed into three parts: the tax (rate),
social security payments (SS) and beneﬁts. According to Goñi et al. (2008),
the small impacts of the Latin American redistribution policy occur via ben-
eﬁts. This pattern also occurs in developed countries, as demonstrated by
Ooghe & Peich (2010).
To decompose the results, consider that (3.10) can be rewritten as:
τ = y − c = τy + τss − B,
where τy is the rate associated with income, τss refers to social security tax
and B are the beneﬁts. In a two-step strategy, one has:
τy = ty,0 + ty   x, τss = tss,0 + tss   x, −B = tB,0 + tB   x.
With x = (xN,xP,xU). Therefore:
19τ = (ty,0 + tss,0 + tB,0) + (ty + tss + tB)   x.
This way, it is possible to assess the impact of each component of τ, and
to categorize them into non-controllable and partially controllable variables.
The estimation results are summarized in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 shows
the composition of τ with regard to the set of non control variables. Figure
8 shows the result for the partially controllable variables.
FIGURE 7 AND 8 HERE
The results conﬁrm the hypothesis that the most important beneﬁts for
τ associated with non-controllable characteristics. Moreover, income tax has
a heavier weight on partially controllable characteristics. These results are
in line with the evidence provided in the literature. However, they do not
have an impact on the unfairness level of the Latin American ﬁscal system,
as the predictions of the theoretical model were not followed.
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21Figure 1: Pretax and Post-tax Gini Coeﬃcient.
22Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Uruguay
Income pretax 1,636 1,403 1,765 1,192 1,675 1,540
Income postax 1,050 950 1,267 812 1,102 1,116
Hours 32 40 31 35 39 34
Employment (%) 60 76 61 66 64 70
Couple (%) 69 64 61 65 54 67
Sex (%) 60 53 68 68 55 62
Education (%)
E1 29 25 32 26 31 30
E2 25 23 37 22 47 35
E3 16 32 21 34 12 24
E4 30 19 14 16 10 16
Age (%)
Age1 30 29 29 30 22 22
Age2 29 32 34 34 31 32
Age3 25 24 22 20 24 23
Age4 13 11 11 10 13 14
Age5 3 2 4 4 7 6
Age6 1 1 10 2 3 3
Sample 3,287 46,593 1,371 2,843 39,464 1,456
2
3Table 2: Earnings Equations: Results From First Stage Regression – Pretax
Variables Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Uruguay
Hours 0.0144* 0.0040* 0.0130* 0.0125* 0.0039* 0.0127*
Age1 0.0069 -0.4742* 0.5463 0.2107* 0.1594* 0.1820*
Age2 0.0961 -0.2873* 0.7239* 0.6528* 0.2942* 0.2459*
Age3 0.1937 -0.1043* 0.6722* 01867* 0.4098* 0.1674*
Age4 0.2324* -0.0469 0.6477 0.6546 0.3523* -0.5632
Age5 0.0516 0.0069 0.3641 0.4319 0.1111* -0.0284
E1 -0.9061* -0.3016* -0.8826* -0.4504* -1.0865* -0.9342*
E2 -0.5546* -0.0142* -0.8084* -0.4985* -0.9854* -0.6532*
E3 -0.4161* 0.2572* -0.4010* -0.5468* -0.4821* -0.4563*
Constant 6.5027* 7.5385* 11.5451* 10.2306* 8.1816* 10.9834*
Adjusted R2 0.2732 0.0921 0.1325 0.1325 0.1430 0.1278
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Sρ p-value Sρ p-value Sρ p-value
Argentina 0.1348 0.0000 0.1311 0.0000 0.0047 0.1623
Brazil 0.3245 0.0000 0.3151 0.0000 0.0014 0.2409
Chile 0.2989 0.0000 0.2933 0.0000 0.0001 0.6485
Colombia 0.3456 0.0000 0.3398 0.0000 0.0065 0.1482
Mexico 0.1256 0.0000 0.1213 0.0000 0.0032 0.1529
Uruguay 0.1209 0.0000 0.1176 0.0000 0.0049 0.1632




Unfair I Unfair II Unfair I Unfair II Unfair I Unfair II
Sρ p-value Sρ p-value Sρ p-value Sρ p-value Sρ p-value Sρ p-value
Argentina 0.1186 0.0000 0.1240 0.0000 0.1154 0.0000 0.1237 0.0000 0.0012 0.3409 0.0015 0.3412
Brazil 0.2858 0.0000 0.2988 0.0000 0.2873 0.0000 0.3002 0.0000 0.0000 0.2982 0.0019 0.2745
Chile 0.2630 0.0000 0.2754 0.0000 0.2514 0.0000 0.2698 0.0000 0.0002 0.5486 0.0002 0.5743
Colombia 0.3041 0.0000 0.3179 0.0000 0.2908 0.0000 0.3029 0.0000 0.0009 0.2103 0.0015 0.1734
Mexico 0.1155 0.0000 0.1105 0.0000 0.1112 0.0000 0.1034 0.0000 0.0019 0.1869 0.0029 0.1620
Uruguay 0.1063 0.0000 0.1003 0.0000 0.1034 0.0000 0.0962 0.0000 0.0031 0.1672 0.0037 0.1600
2
6Table 5: Results From First Stage Regression
Variables Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Uruguay
Hours 4.20* 6.21* 2.35* 8.67* 16.86* 5.43*
Age1 -278.89* -1286.53* 172.97 291.96* -576.67* -342.09*
Age2 -238.53* -1129.67* 280.44 622.69 -181.8 -178.65*
Age3 -167.43* -708.65* 361.04 841.40* 1291.60* -154.03*
Age4 -69.14 -359.48* 580.99 395.72 975.20* 0.78
Age5 -88.02 -240.24* 273.68 55.08 -334.84 -90.43
E1 -551.58* -2625.43* -1252.10* -348.05* -15490.9* -432.74*
E2 -392.56* -2304.39* -1013.69* -529.16* -14276.24* -1234.64*
E3 -316.87* -1835.49* -7501.01* -586.98* -8815.79* -1730.23*
Sex -60.61* 32.61* -53.89 23.57 -483.93* -71.23*
Emplo 301.23* 210.06* 340.23* 900.02 270.49* 123.84
Couple -25.25 181.43* 84.25* 97.60 48.29* 90.34
Constant 959.29* 3643.27* 1399.70* 2469.24* 2044.95* 873.52*
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.30 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.28
Note: *p < 0.10.
2
7Table 6: Results From Second Stage Regression
Variables Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Uruguay
Hours 0.0937* 0.3572* 0.2143* 0.2965* 0.2821 0.2301*
Age 0.1670* 0.3689* 0.2668 0.3539 0.2892* 0.2439*
Educ 0.2310* 0.3775* 0.2648* 0.3669* 0.4366* 0.2754*
Sex 0.3519* 0.2991* 0.2487* 0.3004* 0.3510* 0.2492*
Emplo 0.2970* 0.3863* 0.2943* 0.3495* 0.4329* 0.3091*
Couple 0.5306* 0.4885* 0.1927* 0.5146* 0.2202 0.2134*
Resid 0.2832* 0.3691* 0.2618* 0.3591* 0.5286* 0.2764*
Constant 149.29* 1250.10* 278.66* 446.97* 8847.85* 199.02*
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.73 0.98
Note: *p < 0.10.
2
8Figure 6: Implicit Tax Rate for the Diﬀerent Composite Characteristics.




















29Figure 7: Decomposition Taxes Rate – Noncontrol.
Figure 8: Decomposition Taxes Rate – Partial Control.
30